





























2 In Health Justice: An Argument from the Capabilities Approach, Sridhar 
Venkatapuram defends the case that theories of justice can be assessed 
by how adequately they protect a series of considerations of equal concern 
with reference to health. Throughout the book, Venkatapuram convincingly 
argues against what he calls the “blind spot in modern philosophy regarding 
the connection between the duty to show equal respect and concern and the 
causation and distribution of health” (Venkatapuram 2011, Introduction).
From the start, Venkatapuram emphasizes how the field of political philosophy 
has focused at times on the analysis of social and political causes surrounding 
momentous events such as famines. Yet, until recently, the discipline has 
paid relatively little attention to the social and political determinants of health 
in more diffuse yet widespread and important phenomena. As examples, 
Venkatapuram mentions the silent spread of HIV among political minorities in 
the 1980s and some strong socioeconomic determinants of longevity that still 
pervade developed countries and yet remain strangely absent in case studies 
of modern philosophical work on justice. One of Venkatapuram’s chief purposes 
is to import the type of analysis that economists Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze 
have used to account for the social and political causes of famines in order to 
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make a series of normative claims regarding the distribution of health within and 
across societies. In so doing, he advocates the normative framework provided by 
the capabilities approach.
Capabilities constitute a philosophical construct that has been used in social and 
scientific reports by international organizations such as the United Nations and 
the World Bank, as well as an increasing number of European governments and 
organizations. Capabilities offer some supposed advantages over alternative 
normative frameworks. As Venkatapuram highlights in numerous places in his book, 
the capabilities approach “targets theories and policies that focus on commodities 
such as incomes or on subjective mental welfare, as well as policies that aim for 
maximization without adequate concern for distribution or equity” (Venkatapuram 
2011, chapter 3). In a nutshell, focusing exclusively on incomes may obscure crucial 
differences among individuals in their potentialities to transform those resources into 
desired outcomes. At the same time, the capabilities approach has been particularly 
sensitive to the pitfalls of relying solely on expressed subjective welfare, especially 
given the problem of the coerced or spontaneous mental adaptation of disadvantaged 
populations. In opposition to those philosophical views, the capabilities approach 
offers a list of minimal functions and capabilities that their proponents associate with 
a transnational aspiration toward universal human dignity. Venkatapuram argues for 
the consideration of the capability of health as some sort of “cluster right,” which 
should include diverse, multidimensional legitimate claims, powers, and immunities 
in its promotion and enforcement.
As indicated in the title of this review, a pioneering aspect of Venkatapuram’s 
work resides in taking very seriously the moral relevance of recent work on 
social epidemiology and the causation of health and disease. In one of the most 
interesting parts in the book, Venkatapuram extensively reviews work in the new 
epidemiology or so-called “social determinants of health” framework such as 
the Whitehall studies, which revealed the influence of social status distinguished 
from other possible causes upon the longevity of British civil servants. This kind 
of work, and similar work not reviewed in the book yet showing, for instance, that 
there may be psychosocial causes linking low birth weight to a mother’s perceived 
social status, primarily addresses health differences within developed countries. 
Perhaps the most recognizable recent work in this branch of epidemiology is 


















in societies above a certain threshold of GNP per capita, income inequality is 
a strong predictor of a series of socially undesirable outcomes. Work on the 
distribution of health and disease across societies also figures in Venkatapuram’s 
book. Such is the case of work by Angus Deaton, the recent winner of the Nobel 
Prize in Economics, on the diffusion of health innovations around the world, as 
well as the work of Vicenç Navarro on the differential effects of political economy 
on infant mortality. Venkatapuram’s philosophical purpose consists in promoting 
the recognition that there is, to use his own words, a certain “vulnerability 
to impairment or premature mortality as a direct result of engaging in social 
cooperation” (Venkatapuram 2011, chapter 4). Such precariousness is the result 
of cooperation and competition within and across societies, and understanding 
those externalities of social life and addressing them when necessary becomes a 
form of moral imperative.
Infusing the theory of justice into that kind of scientific empiricism, however, poses 
some consequences. One is that health cannot be conceived as simply another 
form of Rawlsian primary good depending on the mere randomness of a state of 
nature. On the contrary, its social roots need to be incorporated in the elaboration 
of normative claims. Second, such a move favors a multidimensional causes-of-the-
cause model on the origins of relevant inequalities, as is the case in much work in 
this area of the social sciences. These additions to and innovations upon the theory 
of justice should be more than welcome to normative philosophers.
Yet, other issues regarding the association of social determinants of health 
research and the capabilities approach are more difficult to swallow. Although 
Venkatapuram’s book is highly recommendable for chapters in which he criticizes 
earlier philosophical views on the concept of disease (e.g., Christopher Boorse’s 
Biostatistical Theory of Disease), he succeeds in forcing a form of suspension 
of judgment about what health truly is instead of persuading readers that he 
has a thoroughly operationalized, well-delineated concept of health to bring to 
the fore. For a book of several hundred pages with “health” in its title, such an 
absence is astonishing, even if advancing such a well-delineated concept may 
be not only a Herculean task, but a Sisyphean one as well. Clearly, Nussbaum’s 
list of capabilities does not suffice as a catalog of essential help to, for instance, 
practitioners of public health. Ultimately, all that remains for readers is 


































basic capabilities. The components of the cluster are identified through free-
standing ethical reasoning aiming for overlapping consensus across societies” 
(Venkatapuram 2011, chapter 7).
My reference to Sisyphus’s task is motivated by the belief that if components of 
health are to be characterized in that way, then we are left with the never-ending 
quest for the reference of the concept. Such a quest is not problematic per se; 
perhaps health is a kind of socially constructed concept that depends heavily on 
the cultural change of our sense of justice through some form of social bargaining, 
argumentation, and evolution of individual expectations on what health should 
include. This state of affairs may nevertheless be concomitant with the pursuit of 
the capabilities approach to define a series of minimal equal aspirations that should 
be guaranteed across societies in a cosmopolitan fashion. However, one could ask 
for slightly more from philosophers working on the concept of health, who could 
at least come to grips with the nature of the reference of the concept. It may 
be interesting to know, for instance, whether intuitions that support philosophical 
reasoning about health depend on some form of conceptual fragmentation, which is 
a serious possibility, and what theorizing about health accomplishes in transforming 
the vernacular notion of the idea. If a positive concept of health is proposed, then 
some effort toward measuring it or at least delineating some of its criteria is in order. 
If the latter is not a feasible task, then its cause should be recognized by advancing 
a truly philosophical analysis of the concept. This oversight needs pointing out, for 
Venkatapuram himself sometimes seems to dismiss the quantification of morbidity 
and longevity as partial attempts to tackle the health of nations. Surely nobody 
disputes that, in a sense, they are of course partial, for most quantifications in 
social science are partial and indirect. Certainly, Venkatapuram’s interesting thesis 
that “avoiding disease or impairments is not the same thing as the priority of 
health” (Venkatapuram 2011, chapter 1) appeals to non-trivial policy modifications 
concerning the priority of health policies over the simple provision of healthcare 
narrowly understood. Yet, he seems to hint to something more, which soon dissolves 
into something very indeterminate.
Finally, although I applaud Venkatapuram’s incorporation of findings of social 
epidemiology into a theory of justice, perhaps a fairer attempt could have been 
made to incorporate the prima facie plausibility of possible criticisms. Aggregative 


















Venkatapuram readily concedes. However, he may not recognize the need to at 
least address certain specific forms of possible aggregative problems specific to 
findings in social epidemiology literature. Consider, for instance, the situation in 
which some form of social inequality producing undesirable effects was needed in 
certain developed countries in order to produce the kind of technological innovations 
and commercial exchanges that prompt the alleviation of suffering in less developed 
countries. Though I do not defend the latter possibility as a matter of fact, I know 
of some reasonable thinkers with a market libertarian orientation who do, and their 
objections need to be thoroughly addressed. Naturally, a case against this market 
libertarian kind of objection could be built, starting with the idea of unnecessary 
avoidable morbidity. Such a normative intuition would be stronger if supported with 
some evidence. At one point in Health Justice, Venkatapuram criticizes some of 
the theorizing behind the so-called health equity approach on the grounds that it 
gives “too much deference to science” (Venkatapuram 2011, chapter 5). However, 
if we are to provide convincing responses to opponents of the kind of approach that 
Venkatapuram advocates, then there is no other alternative but to enter into that 
kind of argumentation on empirical data. It is not that empirical and falsifiable models 
can always solve the normative question; they cannot. But they figure prominently 
into the “free-standing ethical reasoning aiming for overlapping consensus” that 
Venkatapuram identifies as necessary for pursuing health. Thus, deference will be 
given—indeed, a great deal of it.
Hugo Viciana
